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SYMPOSIUM 
ACHIEVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH 
ADR:  FACT OR FICTION? 
FOREWORD 
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley* 
 
This Foreword offers an overview of Achieving Access to Justice Through 
ADR:  Fact or Fiction?, a symposium hosted by the Fordham Law Review 
and cosponsored by the National Center for Access to Justice and Fordham 
Law School’s Conflict Resolution and ADR Program.  Access to justice is a 
foundational value in our system of law and alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) is enthusiastically promoted as a vehicle for providing that access.1  
This is as true in developing countries as it is in the United States.  For parties, 
ADR promises autonomy, self-determination, and empowerment.  For 
courts, there is the attraction of procedural and administrative reforms and 
greater efficiencies.  An important question raised in this Symposium is 
whether ADR has delivered on its promises.  Does it in fact provide access 
to justice or does it facilitate access to injustice for certain segments of 
society?2 
Reflecting on these questions, this Symposium will offer a critical analysis 
of ADR’s access to justice claims and consider the extent to which they 
should be more modest.  An outstanding group of scholars have addressed 
this question in a variety of contexts, including procedural and substantive 
justice; restorative justice; arbitration; mediation; online dispute resolution 
(ODR); and international, comparative, and cross-cultural perspectives.  This 
Issue of the Fordham Law Review incudes thoughtful, provocative, and 
inspiring papers from thirteen of the Symposium participants. 
Several papers focused on the access to justice challenges presented by 
current practices in arbitration.  In “Arbitration Archetypes for Enhancing 
Access to Justice,” Professor Jill I. Gross questions whether arbitration 
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enhances access to justice relative to litigation, given the increased use of 
arbitration by commercial entities with strong bargaining power.3  She 
describes several critiques of mandatory arbitration based on adhesive 
predispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts.4  In 
addition to the consent critiques, Professor Gross examines the claim that the 
process resulting from an adhesive agreement to arbitrate is unfair.5  Noting 
that the arbitration process differs depending on the forum, the industry, and 
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, she claims that it is not possible to 
generalize in this area given the number of different arbitration subtypes.6  
Rather, she proposes a framework of “arbitration archetypes” that can be 
used as models for reform—to assess whether a particular form of arbitration 
enhances access to justice relative to litigation.7 
In “Arbitrarily Selecting Black Arbitrators,” Professor Michael Z. Green 
addresses the problem of the lack of diversity in the arbitral selection process, 
which is manifested specifically in racial bias and the lack of black 
arbitrators.8  He describes the basic problem as the fact that, despite efforts 
to increase the pools of diverse arbitrators, it is the parties who will select the 
arbitrator, and parties are not incentivized to select an arbitrator based on a 
diversity profile.9  Parties want to win—so they will choose the arbitrators 
they know and their risk aversion prevents their “representatives from using 
highly skilled mediators of color.”10  To remedy the problem, Professor 
Green proposes that arbitration service providers be given a more substantial 
role in the final selection of arbitrators.11  He recommends an approach that 
mimics the selection of federal judges—a pool of diverse arbitrators with 
outstanding qualifications would be provided.12  Instead of allowing parties 
to choose from the pool, the arbitrator assigned to the parties would be chosen 
for them by the neutral service provider in the same random and arbitrary 
manner as a judge is chosen for parties who file a claim in federal court.13 
With a different take on the issue of diversity in arbitration, Professor 
Benjamin G. Davis writes from a historical perspective.14  In “American 
Diversity in International Arbitration:  A New Arbitration Story or Evidence 
of Things Not Seen,” he focuses on the presence of black persons in 
international trade, what he labels the “longer view of diversity,” and 
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examines the evolution of international arbitration law in the United States.15  
He suggests that the invisible presence of blacks and other underrepresented 
groups in the shadows of international arbitration law developments helps us 
to understand that diversity has been a basic part of American international 
arbitration for hundreds of years, even though it has gone unrecognized as 
such.16  In Professor Davis’s view, it was wealth creation both by enslaved 
Africans and ostensibly free blacks that drove developments in American 
arbitration law.17  He then traces American arbitration law developments 
from the 1920 New York Arbitration Law to the Federal Arbitration Act to 
the American accession to the New York Convention of l958.18  The lens 
through which he tells this story is against the background of the civil rights 
struggle of black Americans.19  Taking the story of American international 
commercial arbitration out of what he calls its “restrictive traces,” he brings 
to light the unseen presence of black persons and raises the important 
question of whether blacks have been “underrepresented” or just “unseen” in 
international commercial arbitration.20 
Two papers focused on the emerging world of ODR and its relationship to 
access to justice.  Professor Amy J. Schmitz observes that, in the quest for 
efficient and affordable justice, policymakers have been promoting ODR, 
which allows for claim diagnosis, negotiation, and mediation without the 
transaction costs associated with traditional court proceedings.21  In 
“Measuring ‘Access to Justice’ in the Rush to Digitize,” she calls for a 
cautionary approach to ODR.22  She warns of the possibility that the rush to 
digitize will ignore due process and transparency values in the name of 
efficiency.23  While including herself among those scholars who have 
promoted ODR as a means to expand access to justice, open new avenues to 
remedies, and ease the stress of going to court, she suggests two reasons to 
exercise caution in promoting ODR programs.24  First, studies suggest that 
some users are not very enthusiastic about using ODR, particularly, the poor, 
the elderly, and the less educated.25  Her second concern relates to human 
dynamics—online processes may diminish the empathy and satisfaction that 
comes from being heard in court.26 
Professor Schmitz’s response is to acknowledge the need for empirical 
research along with transparency to help inform best practices.27  Toward 
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that end, she proposes a framework for ODR research that is based on a “who, 
how, and what” analysis.28  Who are the users of ADR systems?  How do 
consumers access and engage with an ODR process versus a face-to-face 
process?  What effect does ODR have on case outcomes?  For her, the bottom 
line is that ODR needs to be “properly deployed, improved, and 
monitored.”29 
Focusing on family law, Professor Kristen M. Blankley offers an 
optimistic view of using online services to enhance access to justice in family 
law cases.30  In her article, “Online Resources and Family Cases:  Access to 
Justice in Implementation of a Plan,” she notes that in most areas of the law, 
enforcement of a court order is “merely an afterthought.”31  However, in 
family law cases, the situation is radically different.32  With respect to orders 
that involve parenting plans, financial plans, or even the terms of a 
guardianship, access to justice requires implementation because these orders 
may extend up to eighteen years, twenty-one years in the case of minors, and 
longer in the case of protected adults.33  While technology is being utilized 
in some areas, particularly with respect to financial obligations, there is a 
need for greater use of it. 
Professor Blankley argues that there is a need for online resources to 
achieve authentic access to justice for families following the implementation 
of parenting and financial plans.34  She discusses the benefits and 
disadvantages associated with different types of technologies, while 
admitting that these tools are not a magic wand.35  In short, authentic access 
to justice in family cases exists when parents are able to honor the promises 
and obligations in their parenting and financial plans.36  In Professor 
Blankley’s view, online resources may be of great assistance in this endeavor, 
to the extent that parents take of advantage of them.37 
In “Does ADR Feel like Justice?,” Professor Jennifer W. Reynolds 
introduces us to the notion of “snap disputes,” which stands for “social 
networks amplifying polarization,” and “conflict spectacles.”38  Snap 
disputes are “highly charged public controversies” characterized by anger 
and fear “that have a substantial online dimension.”39  They play out through 
the media, and, as such, they create and are created by “spectacles of 
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conflict.”40  Within this framework, Professor Reynolds considers “what 
people may be learning from conflict spectacles in the age of snap disputes, 
especially in the context of justice systems and access concerns.”41  She 
argues that “what people believe about justice will affect whether they think 
that existing structures and institutions can provide justice.”42  The 
“questions about access to justice, therefore, must take into consideration not 
only what actual processes and support are available but also what people 
feel will provide justice—based on what they have gleaned from the various 
conflicts spectacles they watch” on a daily basis.43 
Professor Sukhsimranjit Singh addresses some cultural aspects of access 
to justice, noting that the notion of access to justice is unique among cultures 
and can be interpreted in multiple ways by members of different groups.44  
In his article, “Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Across Cultures,” 
he examines several cultural communities that experience diminished access 
to justice.45  Focusing on the specific needs of these diversified communities, 
he examines access to justice theory through their culturally structured 
identities and concludes that the circumstances of each group must be 
considered throughout ADR practices such as mediation.46 
Professor Singh notes that the issue of access to justice primarily impacts 
impoverished and disadvantaged groups who lack the ability to obtain 
assistance on legal matters.47  Reviewing alternative understandings of 
access to justice, he argues that defining justice involves questions of 
enforceability and legitimacy.48  Those who cling to a rigid definition assert 
that justice means access to an established legal system and may go as far as 
to say that ADR-based approaches are insufficient because they do not 
improve the pathways to existing court systems.49  He also explores the 
barriers to accessing justice, including the lack of “an information 
infrastructure to educate those who are unaware that they can pursue a legal 
remedy.”50  With respect to the central question of the Symposium—does 
ADR provide access to justice?—Professor Singh argues that, without an 
established structure as well as precedent in place, “ADR may serve only to 
provoke low-quality justice for the impoverished.”51 
In “Restorative Justice from Prosecutors’ Perspective,” Professors Bruce 
A. Green and Lara Bazelon engage the access to justice conversation through 
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a criminal law lens with a focus on restorative justice.52  The basic goal of a 
restorative justice process is to encourage a mediated discussion between an 
offender and victim, to give the victim an opportunity to explain the impact 
of the offense, and to give the offender a chance to offer an apology and seek 
to understand the causes of the offending behavior.53  Both the victim and 
offender then make a plan to repair the damage and make amends.54 
Outside the United States, restorative justice has been used as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution where the victim and offender both agree 
to use it.55  However, the situation is different in the United States.56  Except 
for a small group of progressive prosecutors, conventional U.S prosecutors 
have an unfavorable view of restorative justice.57  Professors Green and 
Bazelon identify and comment on some of the reasons why traditional 
prosecutors might be skeptical or even hostile toward restorative justice 
processes.58  They then offer arguments to demonstrate that this skepticism 
is unwarranted.59  Restorative justice should not be viewed as a “rejection of 
the traditional adjudicatory process,” they argue, but as “an alternative that 
runs parallel to traditional adjudication.”60  This alternative, they argue, will 
better serve the public interest in reducing recidivism and better serve the 
interests of the crime victim.61 
Relying on Marc Galanter’s understanding of justice62—that justice is 
achieved by pushing back against injustice which is forever changing—
Professor Lydia Nussbaum explores how ADR processes fit within a 
dynamic system of justice.63  In her article, “ADR, Dynamic (In)Justice, and 
Achieving Access:  A Foreclosure Crisis Case Study,” she “argues for a 
dynamic, rather than fixed, conception of access to justice.”64  She then 
locates ADR processes within that dynamic framework as vehicles that 
enhance injustice and sometimes exacerbate preexisting injustice.65 
Using, as a case study, the foreclosure crisis that developed out of the Great 
Recession, she describes the dynamic system of justice and ADR’s evolving 
role within that system.66  State legislatures and courts throughout the 
country created foreclosure ADR programs to respond to the crisis and help 
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parties avoid unnecessary foreclosures.67  Yet, while ADR processes 
provided remedies for some of the injustices created by the financial crisis, 
they also introduced new injustices.68  This is because they were introduced 
into systems “with systemic communication problems, lack of transparency, 
and preexisting power differentials between homeowners and loan 
services.”69  A series of procedural correctives in foreclosure ADR helped to 
remedy some of the new injustices they introduced.70  ADR, Professor 
Nussbaum rightfully points out, “can be only as ‘just’ as the system in which 
it operates.”71   
Two papers considered the potential roles of technology and data in the 
quest for access to justice.  Professor Ellen Waldman’s essay, “How 
Mediation Contributes to the ‘Justice Gap’ and Possible Technological 
Fixes,” focuses on the growing number of self-represented parties who find 
themselves participating in mediation.72  She argues that, for these parties, 
mediation in its current form in the lower courts “risks significant 
depredations of justice.”73  This is due in large measure to ethics rules that 
prevent disputants from receiving the information they need to make 
informed judgments in mediation.74  For Professor Waldman, simply 
providing a forum where disputes can be discussed is insufficient.75  She 
argues that, if the goal is to enhance self-represented parties’ access to justice, 
then we need to be concerned with substantive as well as procedural justice.  
She claims (and I agree) that parties should be provided with the information 
they need to make informed decisions.76  To achieve this end, she 
recommends embracing technologies of both the low-tech and high-tech 
varieties, including algorithms which would give self-represented litigants 
the data that predictive legal forecasting is able to provide.77  Noting that 
artificial intelligence in the legal arena has benefited wealthy corporations, 
she argues that it is time to harness this asset for unrepresented parties who 
mediate in court-connected processes.78 
For Professor Nancy A. Welsh, it is difficult to respond to the question of 
whether ADR provides access to justice because of the lack of data.79  In her 
article, “Bringing Transparency and Accountability (with a Dash of 
Competition) to Court-Connected Dispute Resolution,” she calls for regular 
data collection regarding the use and effects of all court-connected dispute 
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resolution processes and publication of aggregate results.80  Noting that 
courts are now beginning to collect data with respect to their “traditional” 
operations, she argues that the time is right to also seek inclusion of data 
regarding ADR processes.81  After describing the institutionalization of 
mediation and other ADR processes in the federal court system and in 
selected state courts, including California, Florida, Maryland, New York, and 
Texas), she focuses on the data that these courts collect and make publicly 
available.82  Concluding that we still do not know very much, she 
recommends the collection and reporting of data on court-connected 
mediation, which would at least give answers to the following questions83:  
How many cases are referred to mediation?  How many mediations are 
occurring?  How many dispositions result from mediation?  What outcomes 
are produced by court-connected mediation?  How do lawyers and litigants 
perceive the process and its outcomes?  Does mediation and other ADR 
processes provide access to justice or facilitate access to injustice for certain 
segments of society?84 
Professor Howard M. Erichson focuses on mass disputes, including class 
actions and nonclass mass litigation, in which each claimant lacks 
meaningful control over the settlement negotiation process because it is 
controlled on the claimants’ side by a lead lawyer or group of lead lawyers.85  
In his article, “The Dark Side of Consensus and Creativity:  What Mediators 
of Mass Disputes Need to Know About Agency Risks,” he raises concerns 
that mediators’ mindsets and skill sets may work to the disadvantage of 
claimants in mass disputes.86  While acknowledging the importance of 
mediation in the resolution of mass disputes, Professor Erichson warns that, 
unless mediators pay careful attention to agency risks, they “may 
inadvertently become part of the problem rather than part of the solution.”87  
This happens, he explains, when mediators search for “aligned interests 
among those at the bargaining table” and then empower the “lawyer-
negotiators who speak on behalf of large groups of claimants.”88  In doing 
so, “mediators may exacerbate agency risks and undermine claimants’ access 
to justice.”89 
In Professor Erichson’s view, this situation presents both a threat and an 
opportunity.90  The threat is that the mediator’s “striving for consensus” and 
“embracing creativity” may empower “negotiating counsel to the detriment 
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of the great mass of claimants.”91  However, a mediator may be in a good 
position to move settlement discussions away from the provisions that 
mutually benefit class counsel and defendants but not the claimants, and this 
should be viewed as an opportunity.92  His hope is that “awareness of this 
risk will better position mediators to embrace the opportunity and suppress 
the threat.”93 
In “Remedy Without Diagnosis:  How to Optimize Results by Leveraging 
the Appropriate Dispute Resolution and Shared Decision-Making Process,” 
Professor Marianna Hernandez-Crespo Gonstead goes beyond what she 
considers a narrow understanding of ADR as a vehicle for providing access 
to justice and argues that it is important to provide citizens with knowledge 
of conflict literacy—learning how to develop conflict resolution and 
participatory capacity at the individual and collective levels.94  To achieve 
this end, she proposes a “Comprehensive Framework for Conflict 
Resolution” and suggests two analytical tools to implement this framework:  
“Dispute System Design” and “Shared Decisions System Design.”95  
Focusing on Latin America, and specifically Venezuela, Professor Gonstead 
discusses the harmful consequences of failing to develop conflict literacy—
including millions of Venezuelans fleeing their country.96  She emphasizes 
the critical importance of including the perspectives of all stakeholders to 
accurately diagnose the current crisis in order “to select or design the 
appropriate process for a sustainable resolution.”97  Once a sustainable 
resolution has been reached, she “proposes the use of collaborative 
governance to supplement representative democracies and bring about” 
stability.98  Governments, working alone, are unable to bring stability to the 
sociopolitical arena.99  She argues powerfully that “only an organized civil 
society, equipped with conflict resolution and participatory capacity, can 
better stabilize and help unlock the power of the whole.”100 
In addition to the authors whose papers are described above, we would 
also like to thank the other scholars who presented at the Symposium—the 
Honorable Wayne D. Brazil, Professors Ellen E. Deason and Julie 
Macfarlane, and the moderators who generated stimulating discussions—
Professors David Udell, Lela Love, Paul Radvany, and Harold Abramson. 
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